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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-POWER OF FEDERAL COURTS TO GIVE DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS.-Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis By. Co. v. Wallace (1933)
53 S. Ct. 345 holds that a litigation arising under the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act of Tennessee is within the judicial power of the Supreme
Court as a "case or controversy". Plaintiff sought a judicial declaration
that a state excise tax levied on the storage of gasoline was unconstitutional
as a violation of commerce and due process of law clauses, as applied to a
plaintiff engaged in interstate commerce. The court recognized that there
were valuable legal rights actually controverted by adverse parties which
would be directly and substantially affected by a binding adjudication of
these rights. Although injunctive or other relief is normally sought, Pierce
v. Society of Sisters (1925) 268 U. S. 510; Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926)
272 U. S. 365, such relief is not an indispensable element in a judicial con-
troversy, Fidelity National Bank v. Swope (1927) 274 U. S. 123. The court
then says, "But the Constitution does not require that the case or contro-
versy should be presented by the traditional forms of procedure invoking
only traditional remedies."
Strong dicta of four prior decisions disclosed a distinctly contrary posi-
tion. In Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis (1927) 273 U. S. 70, a case
involving a prayer for a declaratory judgment authorized by a Kentucky
statute was brought originally in the federal courts relying upon the Con-
formity Act. The court refused to consider the case on the ground that
there were no adverse parties before the court, indicating a decided distaste
for declaratory judgments. In Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco
Growers' Assn. (1928) 276 U. S. 71, the opinion of the court (by Justice Mc-
Reynolds) says, "This court has no jurisdiction to review a mere declaratory
judgment." In the case of Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Assn. (1928) 277
U. S. 274, involving an alleged cloud on title, Justice Brandeis says that to
grant such relief as a declaratory judgment is beyond the power conferred
on the federal judiciary. Justice Stone in a separate concurring opinion
points out that this statement is unwarranted dicta. In Piedmont & North-
ern By. v. U. S. (1930) 280 U. S. 469 the Supreme Court again indicated its
hostility to the declaratory judgment by stating that such a remedy is not
within the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Twenty-six states, England, and Scotland make use of this social mechanism
in providing relief for adverse parties before valuable legal rights are actually
damaged. Borchard, The Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments (1931)
31 Columbia L. Rev. 561. It is evident from a perusal of the four opinions
cited above that the chief obstacle to the validity of such judgments centered
in the belief that they did not fit the legal concept of justiciable controversies.
In Muskrat v. United States (1911) 219 U. S. 346 it was remarked that "judi-
cial power . . . is the right to determine actual controversies arising be-
tween adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction." In
that case, there were no adverse parties before the court. In Gordon v. United
States (1864) 2 Wall. 561 (memorandum opinion, undelivered opinion pre-
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pared by Chief Justice Taney just before his death, printed in 117 U. S. 697)
there was no possibility of the court's rendering a final judgment. These
and other similar cases are distinguished, and the nature of a declaratory
judgment admirably contrasted in In Re Kariher's Petition (1925) 284 Pa.
455, 131 Atl. 265. The declaratory judgment is merely a remedial change,
a variation in the procedure by which a party may protect a valuable legal
right. The court must be "satisfied that an actual controversy, or the
ripening seeds of one, exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris
and before the court, and that the declaration sought will be of practical help
in ending the controversy." If these elements are not present, the court will
refuse jurisdiction on grounds independent of the nature of declaratory
judgments.
It is gratifying that the Supreme Court at the first time it was called upon
to squarely face the issue in an actual decision recognized the true significance
of the declaratory judgment and distinguished its ill-considered dicta of
previous cases. Such a position has long been urged. See Borchard, The
Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments, supra. S. M. R., '33.
FIXTURES-RIGHT OF REMOVAL By REMOTE ASSIGNEE DESPITE CONTRACT
OF VENDOIL.-Plaintiff agreed to sell a tract of land to S. under an executory
contract of sale, retaining title until all installments were paid. The con-
tract provided that upon a breach by S., plaintiff should have the right of
immediate possession, together with all improvements. Defendant was a
tenant of J., a remote assignee of S.'s rights under the contract. Under his
contract with J. defendant had the right to remove the improvements in
question, which were of a permanent nature. Upon plaintiff's asserting his
right of reentry, the court granted an injunction preventing defendant from
removing certain improvements placed by him on the land. Willard v.
Geary (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 53 S. W. (2d) 489.
It is clear that even without an agreement, if the improvements had been
made either by S. or by J. the right of removal would have been lost, for
buildings and other fixtures erected by one in possession of land under a
contract of purchase become a part of the realty. 1 Thompson, Real Prop-
erty 206. The purchaser in such a case stands in a position analagous to
that of a mortgagor, and has no greater rights of removal than the mortgagor
has as against the mortgagee. 26 C. J. 675.
But the problem here is not so simple. It obviously involves a conflict of
interests, calling for a balancing of equities. There seem to be no other
reported cases precisely in point; but workable analogies are more
abundant.
In Harris v. Hackley (1901) 127 Mich. 46, 86 N. W. 389, a conditional
seller of fixtures to the vendee of land was granted recovery against the
vendor of the land holding title, in spite of an agreement between the vendor
and vendee of the land that the former should get all improvements. The
court held that the agreement between the vendee and the conditional seller
-kept the property personalty even though the vendee might have intended it
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